PENGARUH MEKANISME OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, FREE CASH FLOW, DAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP BIAYA KEAGENAN DI SEKTOR CONSUMER GOODS PERIODE 2009-2014.
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Keywords:
Agency cost, Ownership structure, Free cash flow, Corporate governance
Abstract
ABSTRACT- This study aims to determine the mechanisms anything that can reduce or increase agency costs within the company . The sample used in the study is sector firms Consumer goods listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2009-2014. The mechanisms used in this study is Ownership structure , Free cash flow , and Corporate governance that have an influence on the magnitude of agency costs in the company . This study uses Asset utilization ratio as a measure of agency costs . The data are used as research material was analyzed using panel data regression in Eviews 8. Based on the results of the companies in the consumer goods sector during the period 2009-2014 , Board size can reduce agency costs while the Bank 's Board independence and incentives can increase agency costs .
Keywords: Agency cost, Ownership structure, Free cash flow, Corporate governance.
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References
Ang, J.S., Cole, R.A. and Lin, J.W. (2000), “Agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55 No. 1, pp. 81-106.
Bhagat, S. and Bolton, B. (2008), “Corporate governance and firm performance”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 257-273.
Boyd, B K, 1994, “Board Control and CEO Compensation”, Strategic Management Journal, 15, pp 335-344.
Brown, L. and Caylor, M. (2006b), “Corporate governance and firm valuation”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 409-434.
Byrd, J. and Hickman, K. (1992), “Do outside directors monitor managers?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 195-221.
Claudio Loderer and Urs Waelchli. (2009), “Firm age and performance” [Online], Available : http//www.ssrn.com.
Damodar, gujarati. 2008. Dasar-dasar Ekonometrika. Jakarta : Salemba empat.
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1978), “Agency problems and residual claims”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 327-350.
Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen, 1983a, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325.
Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen, 1983b, Agency problems and residual claims, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 327-49.
Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen, 1985, Organizational forms and investment decisions, Journal of Financial Economics 14, 101-19.
Jensen, Michael C., 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, American Economic Review 76, 323-29.
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3,
305-60
Klein, P, Shapiro, D &Young, J 2005, ‘Corporate governance, family ownership and firm value: the Canadian evidence’, Corporate Governance: An International
Review vol.13, pp769-784.
Krishna and Stuart, L. (2012).“The relationship between ownership structure, capital structure and corporate governance practices”, International Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 10 Iss 4 pp. 511 – 536.
McConnell, J. J. and H. Servaes.Equity ownership and the two faces of debt.Journal of Financial Economi s, 39(1995), p 131~157.
Morck et al. (1988), “Management ownership and Market valuation”, Journal of Financial Economics 20, pp 293-315.
Muth, MM & Donaldson, L 1998, ‘Stewardship theory and board structure: a contingency approach’, Corporate Governance vol.6, pp5-28.
Pearce, J. and Zahra, S. (1992), “Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 411-438.
Sajid et al. (2012), “ Agency cost, Corporate governance and Ownership structure”, International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 3 No 9, pp 268-276.
Short, H. and K. Keasey. Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: evidence from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(1999), p 79~101.
Singh, M.,&Davidson,W. A. (2003). “Agency costs, ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms”. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27, 793–816.
Stapledon, G P, and Lawrence, J J, 1997, “Board Composition, Structure and Independence in Australia’s Largest Listed Companies”, Melbourne University Law Review, 21, pp 150-186.
Yustina Ade. (2008). “Hubungan struktur kepemilikan dan external monitoring terhadap agency cost dan aliran kas”. Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan, Vol. 12, No. 3, hal.343-354.
www. Idx.co.id
Bhagat, S. and Bolton, B. (2008), “Corporate governance and firm performance”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 257-273.
Boyd, B K, 1994, “Board Control and CEO Compensation”, Strategic Management Journal, 15, pp 335-344.
Brown, L. and Caylor, M. (2006b), “Corporate governance and firm valuation”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 409-434.
Byrd, J. and Hickman, K. (1992), “Do outside directors monitor managers?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 195-221.
Claudio Loderer and Urs Waelchli. (2009), “Firm age and performance” [Online], Available : http//www.ssrn.com.
Damodar, gujarati. 2008. Dasar-dasar Ekonometrika. Jakarta : Salemba empat.
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1978), “Agency problems and residual claims”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 327-350.
Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen, 1983a, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325.
Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen, 1983b, Agency problems and residual claims, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 327-49.
Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen, 1985, Organizational forms and investment decisions, Journal of Financial Economics 14, 101-19.
Jensen, Michael C., 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, American Economic Review 76, 323-29.
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3,
305-60
Klein, P, Shapiro, D &Young, J 2005, ‘Corporate governance, family ownership and firm value: the Canadian evidence’, Corporate Governance: An International
Review vol.13, pp769-784.
Krishna and Stuart, L. (2012).“The relationship between ownership structure, capital structure and corporate governance practices”, International Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 10 Iss 4 pp. 511 – 536.
McConnell, J. J. and H. Servaes.Equity ownership and the two faces of debt.Journal of Financial Economi s, 39(1995), p 131~157.
Morck et al. (1988), “Management ownership and Market valuation”, Journal of Financial Economics 20, pp 293-315.
Muth, MM & Donaldson, L 1998, ‘Stewardship theory and board structure: a contingency approach’, Corporate Governance vol.6, pp5-28.
Pearce, J. and Zahra, S. (1992), “Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 411-438.
Sajid et al. (2012), “ Agency cost, Corporate governance and Ownership structure”, International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 3 No 9, pp 268-276.
Short, H. and K. Keasey. Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: evidence from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(1999), p 79~101.
Singh, M.,&Davidson,W. A. (2003). “Agency costs, ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms”. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27, 793–816.
Stapledon, G P, and Lawrence, J J, 1997, “Board Composition, Structure and Independence in Australia’s Largest Listed Companies”, Melbourne University Law Review, 21, pp 150-186.
Yustina Ade. (2008). “Hubungan struktur kepemilikan dan external monitoring terhadap agency cost dan aliran kas”. Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan, Vol. 12, No. 3, hal.343-354.
www. Idx.co.id
Published
2017-09-01
Section
Bidang Manajemen (M)
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